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The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 
 
The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of the 
University of Miami, in cooperation with the Miami European Union Center. 
 
These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which 
will conclude in the Spring of 2003.  The purpose of this Convention is to submit proposals for 
a new framework and process of restructuring the European Union.  While the European Union 
has been successful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the European Union must 
take more modern challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its 
objectives at home and abroad.  The main issues of this Convention are Europe’s role in the 
international community, the concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement 
process.  In order for efficiency and progress to prevail, the institutions and decision-making 
processes must be revamped without jeopardizing the founding principles of this organization.  
During the Convention proceedings, the Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Papers will attempt to 
provide not only concrete information on current Convention issues but also analyze  various 
aspects of and actors involved in this unprecedented event. 
 
The following is a list of tentative topics for this series: 
 
1.  The challenges of the Convention: the ability to govern a supranational Europe or the return 
to intergovernmental cooperation? 
 
2.  How will the member states figure in the framework of the Convention? 
 
3.  The necessity to maintain a community method in a wider Europe. 
 
4.  Is it possible for the member states to jeopardize the results of the Convention? 
 
5.  The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the 
European capitals. 
 
6.  Is it possible that the Convention will be a failure? The effects on European integration. 
 
7.  Similarities and differences between the European Convention and the Philadelphia 
Convention of 1787. 
 
8.  The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world. 
 
9.  How important is European integration to the United States today? 
 
10.  The failure of a necessary partnership?  Do the United States and the European Union 
necessarily have to understand each other?  Under what conditions?  
 
11.  Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European 
Union and Russia? 
 
12.  Russia: a member of the European Union?  Who would be interested in this association? 
 
Miami European Union Center        Jean Monnet Chair Staff: 
University of Miami          Joaquín Roy (Director) 
1531 Brescia Avenue          Aimee Kanner (Editor) 
Coral Gables, FL 33146-3010        Roberto Domínguez (Research Assistant) 
Phone: 305-284-3266; Fax: 305-284-4875      Nouray Ibryamova (Research Assistant) 
E-Mail: jroy@miami.edu          Mariela Arenas (Research Assistant) 
Webs: www.miami.edu/international-studies/euc 
www.euroy.org; www.miamieuc.org  
 
  
2   
 
 
Joining the Club: Reflections from the Iberian Integration in Light of 
the New Enlargement to Eastern Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sebastián Royo
* 
 
 
 
 
The Jean Monnet Chair 
University of Miami 
Miami, Florida 
March 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                   
* Dr. Royo is an Assistant Professor in the Government Department at Suffolk University in Boston and 
affiliate and co-Chair of the Iberian Study Group at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies 
at Harvard University.  Royo’s articles and reviews on Southern Europe and Latin American politics have 
appeared in  South European Society & Politics,  West European Politics ,  SELA,  Democratization, 
Perspectives  on Politics and other publications.  His first book,  From Social Democracy to 
Neoliberalism: T he Consequences of Party Hegemony in Spain, 1982-1996, was published by St. 
Martin’s Press in 2000.  His second book, A New Century of Corporatism? Corporatism in Southern 
Europe: Spain and Portugal in Comparative Perspective, was published by Greenwood Publishing in 
2002.  Royo has recently co-edited a volume about the impact of EU membership on Spain and Portugal: 
From Isolation to Integration  –Spain and Portugal in the European Union after 15 Years.  It will be 
published by Frank Cass in 2003.  He is preparing a policy study analyzing the influence of economic 
institutions on economic policies and competitiveness in Iberia and Latin America.  His research interests 
include corporatism, Southern European and Latin American politics, the European Union, the impact of 
globalization on national economies, the impact of institutions on economic policy and business behavior, 
and the future of the welfare state.  
 
  
3   
JOINING THE CLUB: REFLECTIONS FROM THE IBERIAN INTEGRATION 
IN LIGHT OF THE NEW ENLARGEMENT TO EASTERN EUROPE  
 
 
 
Introduction     
After decades of relative isolation under authoritarian regimes, the success of processes 
of democratic transition in Portugal and Spain in the second half of the 1970s paved the 
way for full membership in the European Community. For Spain, Portugal, and their 
European Community (EC) partners this momentous and long awaited development had 
profound consequences and set in motion complex processes of adjustment.
1 
 
There was no dispute that the Iberian countries belonged to Europe. This was not 
just a geographical fact. Spain and Portugal shared their traditions, their culture, their 
religion, and their intellectual values with the rest of Europe. Moreover, both countries 
had historically contributed to the Christian occidental conceptions of mankind and 
society dominant in Europe. Without Portugal and Spain the European identity would 
only be a reflection of an incomplete body. Iberian countries belonged to Europe. Their 
entry into the European Community was a reaffirmation of that fact, and it would enable 
both countries to recover their own cultural identity, lost since the Treaty of Utrecht, if 
not before. 
 
The Iberian enlargement strengthened Europe’s strategic position in the 
Mediterranean and Latin America, and led to the further development of a European 
system of cohesion and solidarity. Spain and Portugal offered a new geo-political 
dimension to the Union, strengthening it southwards, and ensuring closer ties with other 
regions that had been peripheral to the EC. This process was fostered with Spain’s 
accession to NATO on June 1982, after a long controversy within the country. 2 
 
The purpose of this paper is to use the experience of Portugal and Spain in the 
European Union (EU) as an opportunity to reflect on what has happened to both 
countries since 1986 and draw some lessons from the Iberian experiences that may be 
applicable to Eastern European countries. This paper will identify the basic changes in 
                                                                   
1 References to the European Economic Community (EEC) or the European Union (EU) can be 
misleading if the historical period covered extends past the last two decades. This chapter addresses 
themes in the European Economic Community prior to the introduction of the European Union label in 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. The terms ‘the European Community’ (EC) or ‘the European Union’ (EU) 
are used indistinctly to refer to the European integration process and institutions throughout the article. 
Similarly, ‘Europe’ is here always used to refer to the countries that are members of the European Union, 
either before or after the Maastricht Treaty. In section three when I focus on the ongoing enlargement 
process, I refer to the EU. 
2 The Spanish Socialist Party, PSOE, under its leader Felipe González had led the opposition to 
integration in NATO.  When it won the general election the following October, Mr. González used the 
threat of exiting the Alliance as a tool to speed the negotiations with the EC. The Socialist government 
linked the permanence in NATO with the country’s accession to the Community and “threatened” the 
U.S. and the EC members with a referendum on the country’s permanence in NATO that he had promised 
during the electoral campaign. In the end Mr. González himself supported Spain’s continued membership 
in the Alliance during this referendum, and Spain achieved its objective of joining the Community. 
Nevertheless, this shows that political considerations, again, were critical during the negotiation process. 
See Gómez Fuentes 1986, pp. 41-42.  
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the economies and societies of Portugal and Spain that occurred as a result of European 
integration. 
 
Entry into the EC has brought many benefits to both Spain and Portugal. In 
sixteen years both countries have successfully turned around the unfavorable conditions 
of their accession treaties (particularly Spain). EU membership has improved the access 
of both countries to the European common policies and the EU budget. At the same 
time Portugal and Spain's trade with the Community has expanded dramatically over the 
past fifteen years, and there has been a significant increase in foreign investment. One 
of the main consequences of these developments has been a reduction in the economic 
differentials that separated each country from the European average. Since 1986, 
Portugal's average per capita income has grown from 56 percent of the EU average to 
about 74 percent, while Spain's has grown to 81 percent. The culmination of this process 
was the participation of both countries as original founders of the European Economic 
and Monetary Union in 1999.  
 
From the standpoint of European policy, EC membership mattered to Spain and 
Portugal because the EC's decisions directly affected  the Iberian countries. Indeed, some 
of the decisions adopted by the EC had an even greater impact over these economies 
than some decisions of their national administrations. In this regard, entry into the EC 
has allowed both countries to have influence on decisions taken at the European level, 
which affected both countries, and over which before accession they had little influence, 
and in any case, no voting power. Since their accession, Portugal and Spain have played 
an important role in the process of European integration and have become again key 
actors in the European arena. At the same time, they have contributed decisively to the 
development of an institutional design of the European Union that has been largely 
beneficial to their interests. Finally, Portugal and Spain have participated successfully in 
the development and implementation of the Single Market and the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). 
 
The process of integration into Europe has also influenced cultural 
developments. As part of their democratic transitions and European integration, both 
countries attempted to come to terms with their own identities, while addressing issues 
such as culture, nationality, citizenship, ethnicity, and politics. At the dawn of the new 
millennium it would not be an exaggeration to say that the Spaniards and the Portuguese 
have become "mainstream Europeans," and that many of the cultural differences that 
separated these two countries from their European counterparts have dwindled as a 
consequence of the integration process. 
 
EU integration, however, has also brought significant costs in terms of economic 
adjustment, loss of sovereignty, and cultural homogenization. In addition, accession has 
also brought more integration but also fears (exacerbated by issues such as size, culture, 
and nationalism). 
 
At a time when European countries are on the threshold of major change, with 
an ambitious plan to integrate the economies of Central and Eastern Europe, the lessons 
derived from analysis of the Spanish and Portuguese experiences should be instructive 
to scholars, students, and policymakers working on expansion and integration issues. 
Moreover, the examination of these two cases will shed new light on the challenges  
 
  
5   
(and opportunities) that less developed countries face when trying to integrate 
regionally or into the global economy. 
 
The paper proceeds in three steps. I analyze first the consequences of the EU 
integration for the Iberian countries. In the following section, I examine the challenges 
presented by the ongoing enlargement of the EU for Portugal and Spain. The paper 
closes with some lessons for Eastern European countries. A central argument will be 
that political considerations were key in the decision by Spain and Portugal to join the 
EC. 
 
Consequences of EU Integration 
 
Political and Sociological Consequences 
 
EU membership was decided on the basis of political rather than economic 
considerations. Nearly forty years of authoritarianism, which kept both Iberian countries 
marginalized from the process of European integration, further i ncreased their desire to 
become part of the EC. Indeed, i n the second half of the past century, the European 
Community epitomized in the eyes of the Portuguese and Spanish citizens the values of 
liberty, democracy, and progress absent in both countries.  In  the words of a famous 
Spanish philosopher, Ortega y Gasset, ‘Spain is the problem and Europe the solution.’ 
In addition, Iberian entrepreneurs knew that their only future lay in Europe. Belonging to 
the European club was a mission not to be questioned.  After years of relative 
isolationism, both countries finally joined the European integration process in the 
expectation that it would help consolidate their newly established democratic 
institutions, modernize their outdated economic structures and finally,  normalize 
relations with their European neighbors. 
 
Over the last sixteen years Portugal and Spain have undergone profound 
transformations. The democratic regimes installed in the 1970s have lasted far longer 
and attained a greater degree of stability than earlier democratic episodes in both 
countries. EC membership finally ended the political isolation of both Iberian countries. 
As one illustrious Spanish intellectual stated: 
 
“For the last two centuries Spain has practically been neutralized in the 
international field. Having our country cease to be an active element in the 
process of world history, we Spaniards have lost, not just the necessary mental 
habits, but also the very notion of sharing our destiny in the march of the 
Universal History.”
3 
 
Indeed, EC membership paved the way for the complete incorporation of both 
countries into the major international structures of Europe and the West,  as well as the 
normalization of Portugal and Spain’s relations with their European partners. Portugal 
and Spain have become, again, important players in Europe. At the domestic level, 
Portugal and Spain undertook deep processes of institutional, social, and cultural 
reforms. Hence, from a political standpoint EU integration has been an unmitigated 
success, as both countries have consolidated their democratic regimes and institutions. 
                                                                   
3 Sánchez Albornoz 1973, p. 281.  
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The two processes—European integration and  democratization—are thoroughly 
intertwined.  
 
The EC (and international pressures in general) were unquestionably important 
in this development.4  When the European Community was founded, it pledged to 
protect the principles of peace and liberty. Whatever other difficulties or problems may 
arise, this was the fundamental objective of the Community. Given this commitment, 
the still young democracies of Spain and Portugal needed to be given a positive answer 
regarding their integration. Otherwise, there would be the risk of weakening these new 
democracies that Europe had committed to defend. This objective was clearly stated by 
European leaders, “The accession of Spain to the Community emanates from a political 
purpose, aiming at the stability, the consolidation and the defense of the democratic 
system in Europe.”
5 The European Commission itself recognized the fact that 
integration into the EC was essentially a political choice. The opening of the 
negotiations was an explicit recognition that major changes had taken place in Spain 
and Portugal, which needed to be protected and consolidated within the European 
context. In other words, the political, economic and social stability of Portugal and 
Spain were perceived as stability factors for the Community itself.6  
 
In Portugal and Spain, integration was viewed by the political and economic 
elites as the best way to consolidate the fragile structures of the Iberian democracies, 
and therefore, Europeanization and democratization were considered complementary 
processes.  Formal accession negotiations to enlarge the EC began with Portugal in 
October 1978 and with Spain in February 1979. Accession was viewed as a means to 
consolidate political and economic reforms in both countries. After almost forty years of 
authoritarianism and very little democratic experience, democracy was still uncertain in 
Iberia. In Spain, the failed coup d'état led by Colonel Tejero in February of 1981 was a 
rude awakening to the reality of the fragility of the new democratic regime. In Portugal 
the instability and uncertainties surrounding the failed revolutionary attempt of the 
1970s highlighted the precariousness of the democratization process. The lessons from 
both experiences were very important for both countries. Portugal and Spain still had to 
go a long way to strengthen their democratic reforms and institutions. On the other 
hand, the Spanish King’s firm stance in favor of democracy, as well as the rejection by 
the overwhelming majority of the population of Tejero’s attempt, offered positive 
perspectives for the newborn democracy. In Portugal the excesses and instability of the 
revolutionary period offered strong signals about the p otential pitfalls of a transition 
gone adrift. In this context Portugal and Spain’s application to the EC sought to 
strengthen their young democratic processes. Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that 
the underlying reasons for the integration of Portugal and Spain in the EC were mostly 
political. Political forces were particularly dominant in shaping the direction of events 
in the enlargement as well as in determining the terms of accession.  In many cases not 
only the general public but also many political parties had not fully grasped the full 
economic consequences of the integration.7 
                                                                   
4 The democratization literature has theorized about how external influences may affect democratization 
processes and has generated a range of concepts. Pridham (2002, 183) outlines the following ones: 
“diffusion, contagion,  consent, penetration, demonstration effect, emulation, reaction, control (or, 
externally monitored installation of democracies), incorporation, obviously interdependence, and finally 
conditionality.” 
5 Rippon 1980, p. 107. 
6 González 1980, p. 47. 
7 Vaitsos 1982, p. 243.  
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Some scholars have theorized on the influences European integration has had on 
the Iberian democratization processes focusing on its symbolic impact (i.e. “the 
identification of EU with liberal democracy and political freedom”), the pressures 
induced by the democratization pre-requisite for membership; the effect of membership 
prospects on domestic policies and policy direction; and finally, the involvement of 
political and economic elites in European institutions during negotiations as well as 
their participation in European transnational networks.
8  
 
In the Iberian cases the EC played a significant role in the success of this 
process. In addition to the EC’s demonstrative and symbolic influence due to the EC 
association with democracy and freedoms, the EC had important indirect levers, 
particularly during the negotiations for accession, to influence the direction of events 
and the decisions of policymakers and economic actors (i.e., economic incentives). 
During the early phases of the democratization processes, the most important lever was, 
obviously, the democratic precondition for EC entry. Brussels defined explicitly the 
institutional conditions that would satisfy this requirement and European leaders made 
them very explicit to the Iberian leaders. According to Pridham these conditions 
included: “the inauguration of free elections; the predominance of parties supportive of 
liberal democracy; the existence of a constitution; and evidence of a reasonably stable 
government led, if possible, by a political figure known and approved in European 
circles.”
9 European leaders stated that accession negotiations would not proceed and the 
applications from these countries would not be considered as long as these countries did 
not demonstrate significant progress in these areas.  
 
In addition, the repetitive refusals to consider the Spanish application for 
membership during the Franco years strengthened the positions of opposition groups 
and economic actors supporting democracy. They used EC membership as an additional 
inducement to support democratization and convince the Spanish people of the potential 
benefits of membership. In addition, democratization processes received explicit 
support from the EC. Following the failed coup d’etat of 1981 the European Parliament 
(and many European leaders) passed a resolution condemning it and expressing support 
for Spanish democracy. The message was loud and clear: the success of the coup would 
hav e resulted in the immediate cancellation of the accession negotiations. The decision 
to proceed with the negotiations was therefore the ultimate lever in the hands of the EC 
to push for democratization in both countries. In Portugal, following the revolution of 
April 1974, European governments exerted considerable bilateral pressures to follow 
through with the democratization process.10 These developments obviously had an 
impact on Portuguese and Spanish economic and political actors during the transition 
and contributed to the consolidation of the new democratic regimes. Finally, the Iberian 
leaders used the fragile and unstable situation of their countries as leverage to push 
forward the accession process and to obtain financial and institutional support from the 
European governments, which they used to strengthen their domestic position, as well 
as legitimize the system and the new democratic institutions.  
 
EC membership has also contributed to the consolidation of the Iberian 
democratic regimes.
11 Pridham argues that membership has had the following impact: 
                                                                   
8 Pridham, 2002, pp. 185-86. 
9 Pridham, 1991, pp. 234-35. 
10 Pridham 2002, pp. 188-89 and Pridham 1991, pp. 234-35. 
11 Pridham 2002, pp. 194-205.  
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First, it helped link “enhanced national self-image with possible feelings for 
democracy.” In addition, financial contributions from the EC budget as well as the 
economic benefits of membership (i.e. FDI), contributed to improve economic 
conditions and mitigated some of the negative effects of liberalization and 
modernization of the outdated economic structures of both countries. In turn, improved 
economic conditions and better prospects for social and political stability influenced 
public opinion and helped to legitimize the new system and to strengthen support for 
democracy. Membership also forced the Iberian countries to align their institutions to 
the  acquis communitaire, which reinforced democratic practices and induced 
democratic governments to push for administrative reforms and decentralization (for 
instance, Portugal reformed its Constitution in 1989 to allow for re-privatization of 
companies that had been nationalized during the revolution). Finally, membership also 
promoted elite socialization and the development of transnational networks, which, for 
instance proved vital for the strengthening of interest groups and political parties (such 
as the Spanish and Portuguese Socialist parties, which received substantive support 
from their European counterparts). The development of economic interests and 
networks at the European level also strengthened the support of economic actors for 
democracy.   
 
The EC, however, lacked the direct intervention instruments (such as armed 
intervention) that could have had a systemic effect on the Iberian democratization 
processes. The actors involved in the transition had the powers to influence events and, 
hence, they were the ones that ultimately determined the final outcomes. Domestic 
dynamics are thus, critical. The process of European integration interacted with a wide 
variety of domestic social, political, and economic factors that shaped the new 
democracies. In Spain a radical and unparalleled process of devolution to the 
autonomous regions has led to a decentralized state that has culminated with the 
development of the Autonomous Communities.
12  In Portugal, following the collapse of 
the revolutionary attempt, the state also undertook a systemic process of modernization. 
However, the two transitions were substantially different. In Portugal, the road to 
democracy started with a clear break, the coup of April 25, 1974. In Spain, on the 
contrary, the transition was more consensus-oriented. These two paths to democracy 
(among other factors) have resulted in enduring differences in the two Iberian 
democracies in terms of institutional developments (i.e., in Portugal, a decentralization 
attempt was defeated in a referendum), economic performance (i.e., Spain has 
experienced higher levels of unemployment), and collective life (i.e., support for unions 
and political parties is higher in Portugal than  in  Spain, and differences in labour 
participation rates). Indeed, European integration has not eliminated major differences 
bet ween the Iberian countries. In addition, integration cannot explain the broader 
patterns of political transformation with its clearly identifiable underpinnings in the two 
countries. These enduring differences illustrate the limitations of research attempts that 
have sought to causally link the Iberian democratic transitions to internationally rooted 
and domestically supported pressures for European integration.  In the end, as it has 
been correctly stated by Fishman (2001:8) “ the political motivations guiding their 
assessment of Europe during the crucial years leading up to EC membership were 
strongly shaped by the Iberian’s held attitudes toward democracy and regime transition, 
attitudes formed within the context of the distinctive political experience of each case.”  
                                                                   
12 Supporters of decentralization and the regionalist parties viewed the process of European integration as 
a model of decentralization, and saw EC integration as an instrument to ensure the decentralization of the 
Spanish political system. See Alvarez -Miranda, 1996 and Magone 2002, p. 229.  
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From a sociological standpoint EU membership has also resulted in attitudinal 
changes that have influenced the political culture of both countries. From the beginning 
there was strong support from public opinion and elites for the integration  of both 
countries into Europe as a means to consolidate the new democratic regimes. They 
viewed democratization and European integration as part of the same process. Hence, 
successive governments in both Portugal and Spain associated European integration 
with the modernization of their countries and this helped shift public opinion’s attitudes 
towards their governments and democracy. In addition, other scholars have noted that 
by allowing for the active involvement of both countries in European institutions, 
European integration contributed to change the ‘isolationist-fatalist attitude’ of the 
political classes.13 Public opinion surveys from Eurobarometer and Madrid’s Center of 
Sociological Investigations have shown a sustained increase in positive ratings effects 
for the functioning of democracy.  Support for the relationship between the Iberian 
countries and the EU has been widespread in both countries since 1986 despite 
fluctuations. This almost unanimous consensus in favor of integration into Europe 
seems to be the consequence of Portugal and Spain’s need to overcome their historical 
isolation from the rest of Europe since the nineteenth century until the end of the 
authoritarian regimes in the 1970s. This development contributed to the legitimating of 
the new democratic system (and thus the consolidation of democracy).  
 
However, the greatest consensus elicited toward the EU is instrumental 
(particularly in Spain), with levels of diffuse affective support for the EU being low, 
although high in comparative p erspective. The polling data collected by Madrid’s 
Center of Sociological Investigations (CIS) and Eurobarometer show that Portuguese 
and Spaniards feel linked by geographical and affective feelings to Europe and 
Europeans. However, they do not identify cl osely with a so-called “common European 
culture.” The reason for this is that despite a shared history and traditions, there is an 
absence of a pre-modern common past and a European heritage that would have 
allowed for the emergence of a unified European identity. Therefore, the image of a 
“European community” among Iberian people is very weak. Indeed, they perceive the 
EU as an economic community, not so much as a community of Europeans. The 
Eurobarometer and CIS polling data show that the perceptions from Iberian citizens 
about the personal and collective benefits derived from EU membership are one of the 
key factors that help explain their attitudes towards the process of European integration.  
Consequently, it is not surprising that polling data show that Portuguese and Spaniards 
have a utilitarian and instrumentalist concept of the EU—i.e. they evaluate the 
consequences of membership over issues such as living costs, infrastructures, job 
opportunities, wages, etc. Iberian citizens develop an implicit cost/benefit analysis and 
based on this evaluation adopt a position in favor or against European integration. 
Hence, approval of Europe seems to coincide with the economic cycles: low during 
economic recessions, and high during periods of economic growth. Finally, when 
comparing the attitudes of Spanish and Portuguese citizens’ vis-à-vis other European 
citizens the former support the EU more, but also stress further the need to build a social 
Europe.14 
 
 
                                                                   
13 Magone 2002,  p. 225. 
14 From CIS: Opiniones y actitudes de los españoles ante el proceso de integración e uropea. Madrid: 
1999, pp, 131-32 ; and Magone 2002, pp. 223-33.   
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Table 1: Support for EU, EMU, CFSP, and Enlargement 
  EU 
Membership 
is Good 
Trust the 
European 
Commission  
Support 
EMU 
Support 
CFP 
Support 
CSP 
Support 
New 
Members 
Spain  63  62  68  68  76  58 
Portugal  61  52  57  57  71  52 
Source: Eurobarometer, October-November 2000. 
 
Finally, it is important to stress that in terms of political behavior, EU 
membership has not transformed activism and political participation in Portugal or 
Spain. Levels of support for democracy as a legitimate political regime, preferable to 
any other alternative, have usually remained high (around 80 percent of the responses in 
surveys), and Portuguese and Spaniards declare themselves satisfied with the 
functioning of democracy. Yet, political cynicism continues to be a major component of 
political attitudes and the political behavior of Portuguese and Spanish citizens. These 
countries still have the lowest levels of participation of Western Europe and 
membership in political and civic associations remains very low. At the same time, 
citizens do not have a feeling of political influence and express a strong sense of 
ambivalence towards political parties and the political class, which is translated into a 
rather low interest in politics.
15 
 
Economic and Social Consequences 
Economic conditions in Spain and Portugal in the second half of the 1970s and first h alf 
of the 1980s were not buoyant. The world crisis caused by the second oil shock in the 
late 1970s and the lack of adequate response from the collapsing authoritarian regimes 
in both countries intensified the structural problems of these economies. Portugal had 
been a founding member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and had 
lowered its trade barriers earlier, and was theoretically in a better position than Spain. 
However, Salazar did even less than Franco to encourage entrepreneurship and 
competition. This factor combined with the costs of the colonial wars, and the 
disruptions caused by the revolution and a near decade of political upheaval 
dramatically worsened the economic situation. For instance, in the 1960s Portugal’s 
income per capita was about three quarters that of Spain and in the late 1980s it was 
only one-half. By the time of accession Spain was the EC’s fifth largest economy, and 
Portugal its tenth.
16  
The economic crisis of the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s had 
devastating consequences in both countries and made any additional adjustments caused 
by the accession to the EC a daunting prospect. In Spain the high unemployment levels, 
which reached 22 percent in 1986, suggested that any additional adjustment cost would 
have painful consequences.
17 In addition, the country was unprepared for accession - 
i.e., Spanish custom duties remained on the average five times higher than the EC’s and 
EC products faced a major disadvantage in the Spanish market because the country had 
a compensatory tax system and restrictive administrative practices that penalized harder 
                                                                   
15 Pérez-Díaz, 2002, pp. 280-84 and Magone 2002, p. 232. 
16 From “Not quite kissing cousins,” in The Economist , May 5, 1990, v. 315, n. 7653, p. 21. 
17 Hine 1989, p. 7.  
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imported products.
18 Slow license delivery was common, and contractors that sold 
vehicles in the country did not have import quotas to introduce cars into Spain from 
abroad.  Finally, when Spain and Portugal knocked on the door of the EC for accession 
in 1977, protectionist institutions-which were incompatible with EC rules-were still 
fully operative in both countries. For instance, the Spanish government controlled 
through the National Institute of Industry (I.N.I) a considerable size of the economy, 
and subsidized public enterprises such as the auto making companies (SEAT, ENASA), 
as well as the metallurgic, chemical, ship construction and electronic sectors. This 
situation provided a considerable advantage for Spanish manufacturers, which were 
highly protected from foreign competition. 
In this context, EU integration was a catalyst for the final conversion of the 
Iberian countries into modern Western -type economies. Indeed, one of the key 
consequences of their entry into Europe has been that membership has facilitated the 
modernization of the Iberian economies.
19  This is not to say; however, that membership 
was the only reason for this development. The economic liberalization, trade 
integration, and modernization of these economies started in the 1950s and 1960s and 
both countries became increasingly prosperous over the two decades prior to EU 
accession.  
The economic impact of the EC started long before accession. The Preferential 
Trade Agreements (PTAs) between the EC and Spain (1970) and the EC and Portugal 
(1972), resulted in the further opening of European markets to the latter countries, 
which paved the way for a model of development and industrialization that could also 
be based on exports. The perspective of EU membership acted as an essential 
motivational factor that influenced the actions of policymakers and businesses in both 
countries. Henceforth, both countries took unilateral measures in preparation for 
accession including increasing economic flexibility, industrial restructuring, the 
adoption of the VAT, and intensifying trade liberalization. Through the European 
Investment Bank they also received European aid (Spain since 1981) to mitigate some 
of the expected adjustment costs (for instance on fisheries).  
In addition, the actual accession of both countries after 1986 forced the political 
and economic actors to adopt economic policies and business strategies consistent with 
membership and the acquis communitaire (which included the customs union, the VAT, 
the Common Agriculture and Fisheries Polices, and the external trade agreements; and 
later the Single Market, the ERM, and the Economic and Monetary Union).  
EU membership also facilitated the micro- and macroeconomic reforms that 
successive Iberian governments undertook throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In a context 
of strong support among Iberian citizens for integration, membership became a 
facilitating mechanism that allowed the Iberian governments to prioritize economic 
rather than social modernization and hence, to pursue difficult economic and social 
policies (i.e., to reform their labor and financial markets), with short-term painful 
effects. Moreover, the decision to comply with the EMU Maastricht Treaty criteria led 
to the implementation of macro- and microeconomic policies that resulted in fiscal 
consolidation, central bank independence, and wage moderation. 
                                                                   
18 For example, EC vehicles imported to Spain paid a custom duty of 27% to 30.4% plus a compensatory 
tax of 13%.  See Couste 1980, p. 129. 
19 See Tovias 2002.  
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Nevertheless, the process of EC integration also brought significant costs in 
terms of economic adjustment, and loss of sovereignty. Under the terms of the accession 
agreement signed in 1985 both countries had to undertake significant steps to align their 
legislation on industrial, agriculture, economic, and financial polices to that of the 
European Community. These accession agreements also established significant 
transition periods to cushion the negative effects of integration. This meant that both 
countries had to phase in tariffs and prices, and approve tax changes (including the 
establishment of a VAT) that the rest of the Community had already put in place. This 
process also involved, in a second phase, the removal of technical barriers to trade. 
These requirements brought significant adjustment costs to both economies.  
Since 1986 the Portuguese and Spanish economies have undergone profound 
economic changes. EU membership has led to policy and institutional reforms in the 
following economic areas: monetary and exchange rate policies (first independent 
coordination, followed by accession to the ERM, and finally EMU membership); reform 
of the tax system (i.e. the introduction of the VAT, and reduction of import duties); and 
a fiscal consolidation process. These changes have led to deep processes of structural 
reforms aimed at macroeconomic stability and the strengthening of competitiveness of 
the productive sector. On the supply side, these reforms sought the development of 
well-functioning capital markets, the promotion of efficiency in public services, and the 
enhancement of flexibility in the labor m arket. As a result markets and prices for a 
number of goods and services have been deregulated and liberalized; the labor market 
has been the subject of limited deregulatory reforms; a privatization program was 
started in the early 1980s to roll back the presence of the government in the economies 
of both countries and to increase the overall efficiency of the system; and competition 
policy was adapted to EU regulations. In sum, from an economic standpoint the 
combined impetuses of European integration and economic modernization have resulted 
in the following outcomes: 
 
•  The end of economic isolation  •  Increasing competition 
•  Institutional reforms  •  Industrial restructuring 
•  Tax harmonization  •  Capital flow liberalization 
•  Openness of the Iberian 
economies  •  Deregulation 
•  Nominal convergence  •  Lower inflation 
•  Capital infrastructure effort  •  Fiscal consolidation 
•  Financial liberalization  •  Cohesion Policies 
•  Central Bank independence  •  Lower nominal interest rates 
•  Privatization  •  Internationalization 
•  FDI in Iberia  •  Higher efficiency  
•  Labor market reform  •  Deregulation 
•  Reduction in government 
subsidies  •  Economic growth 
  
 
  
13    
In terms of static effects, EC accession has resulted in trade creation in the 
manufacturing sector. Indeed, it has had dramatic effects in trade patterns.
20 As a matter 
of fact, in the early 1980s the Spanish economy was the least open to industrial trade of 
any of the EC members. Hence, the participation in a customs union like the EC has 
resulted in the dismantling of trade barriers for the other members of the union. Trade 
liberalization also exposed the highly protected and non-competitive sectors of the 
economy to foreign competition.
21  
Some EC products already had preferential access to the Portuguese and Spanish 
markets as a result of the 1970 and 1972 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). Trade 
creation was reasonably expected given the high level of protection (particularly in 
Spain) before accession to the EC as well as the similarity of the structure of industry in 
Portugal, Spain, and the EC.22 Accession did not have negative consequences on non-
EC suppliers because Spain and Portugal’s tariffs on non-EC imports were aligned to 
the common external tariff, which in general was much lower than Iberian tariffs on 
non-EC imports prior to accession. Furthermore, as a result of the 1970 and 1972 PTAs 
Spain and Portugal had already benefited from a substantial cut in the external Common 
Customs Tariff, therefore Iberian exports to the EC did not have discriminatory effects 
on other non-EC suppliers. Finally, the opening of the Portuguese and Spanish markets 
has led to an increase of intra-industry trade, and hence less acute labor adjustments 
problems. 
At the same time, however, for the Iberian manufacturers accession to the 
Community has also resulted in more competition. Since Portuguese and Spanish 
nominal tariffs averaged 10-20 percent before EC entry, and generally speaking 
manufacturing EC products were cheaper and more competitive, membership has 
resulted in an increase of imports from the EC and therefore, on a worsening in the 
balance of the current accounts (and the closure of many industrial enterprises in Iberia). 
The intensity of the adjustment, however, has been mitigated by the  behavior of 
exchange rates and by the dramatic increase in the levels of investment in these two 
countries. Spain and Portugal have been attractive production bases since together they 
offer access to a large market of 48 million people, and a well-educated and 
cheap -compared with the EC standards-labor base.  In the end, the tran sitional periods 
adopted in the treaty to alleviate these adjustment problems and the financial support 
received from the EC played a very important role in minimizing the costs for the 
sectors involved.  
Portugal and Spain had benefited from their Preferential Trade Agreements with 
the EC on manufactured goods.  However, these agreements left both countries outside 
of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). While the composition of GDP had changed 
significantly in both countries throughout the 1960s, in the 1970s agriculture was still a 
                                                                   
20 The framework for the section on trade draws from Robert C. Hine, “Customs Union Enlargement and 
Adjustment: Spain’s Accession to the European Community,” in  Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Volume XXVIII, No. 1. September 1989. 
21 Imports of manufactured goods in 1986 were equivalent to 11.0% of Spain’s GDP.  On the other hand, 
the relatively closed nature of the Spanish industry was also reflected in the amount of industrial exports 
which were only 10.9% of GDP. In the EC the averages were 14.4% and 27.7% of GDP respectively. 
Hine 1989, p. 7. 
22 For instance, since the late 1950s S pain had been moving away from industries based on low-
technology, low capital requirement, and unskilled labor such as textiles, leather, shipbuilding and food, 
towards more capital intensive industries that required more labor skills such as chemicals, or vehicles. 
See Hine 1989, pp. 9-12.  
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critical sector for the Portuguese and Spanish economies.  In Spain more than 10 million 
people-17 percent of the population-relied on the agricultural sector to make a living. 
Spanish agriculture accounted for 9 percent of GDP and its agricultural output was 16.5 
percent of the Community total.  In Portugal the share of agriculture represented 16 
percent in 1973 (down from 23 percent in 1961).  
The Iberian governments (particularly the Spanish one), however, were much 
more effective in achieving a reasonable compromise in the manufacturing sector 
during the accession negotiations, than they were in the agricultural sector. Arguably, 
this might have happened because in the industrial sector the governments had to satisfy 
their workers (an important electoral constituency), as well as the unions, which were 
well organized and had influence in the ruling parties. On the contrary, Iberian farmers 
(particularly in Spain) were not so well organized and hence were not as effective 
pressuring for a better agreement. It is also true that on agriculture some EC members, 
particularly France, held more intransigent positions during the negotiations. 
The integration of Spain and Portugal in the EC offered opportunities for both 
trade creation and trade diversion in agriculture.  Since Spain and Portugal had been 
kept out of the CAP before accession, EC membership gave better access conditions to 
Iberian agricultural exports to the Community.  This was particularly true given the 
good quality of these products and their lower prices-compared with those of the EC. 
At the same time, the increase of Portuguese and Spanish agricultural exports to the 
Community displaced imports from other countries. The main source of adjustment 
problems was trade creation because greater import penetration led to a contraction in 
domestic production. For Spain one of the main challenges of accession was the result 
of the regional diversity of its agriculture because it has not been easy for farmers 
affected by the C AP to switch to other products given the differences in the 
environment, weather, and fertility conditions.
23 From an agricultural standpoint the 
fears of trade diversion materialized after accession (in favor of other EU members such 
as Italy and France),  which contributed to increased migration from rural areas to the 
cities. 
At the time of accession, it was considered that a critical factor to determine the 
final outcome of integration would depend upon the pattern of investment, which would 
bring about important dynamic effects. Spain and Portugal had a number of attractions 
as a production base including; good infrastructure, an educated and cheap labor force, 
and access to markets with a growing potential. In addition, EC entry would add the 
incentive of further access to the EC countries for non-EC Iberian investors-i.e. Japan 
and the United States. As expected, one of the key outcomes of integration has been a 
dramatic increase in foreign direct investment, from less than 2% to more than 6% of 
GDP over the last decade. This development has been the result of the following 
processes: economic integration, larger potential growth, lower exchange rate risk, 
lower economic uncertainty, and institutional reforms. EU membership has also resulted 
in more tourism (which has become one of the main sources of income for Spain).  
                                                                   
23 Hine 1989, pp. 16-18.  
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Another significant dynamic effect has been the strengthening of Iberian firms' 
competitive position. As a result of enlargement Iberian producers gained access to the 
European market, providing additional incentives for investment and allowing for the 
development of economies of scale, resulting in increased competitiveness. By the 
1980s Spain and Portugal were already facing increasing competition for their main 
exports-clothing, textiles, leather-from countries in the Far East and Latin America, 
which produced all of these goods at cheaper costs exploiting their low wages. As a 
result of this development, the latter countries were attracting foreign investment in 
sectors in which traditionally Portugal  and  Spain had been favored. This situation 
convinced the Iberian leaders that their countries had to shift toward more capital -
intensive industries requiring greater skills in the labor force but relying on standard 
technology-e.g. chemicals, vehicles, steel and metal manufacturers.  In this regard, 
Portugal and Spain’s entry into the EC facilitated this shift.  Both countries gained 
access to the EC market, thus attracting investment that would help build these new 
industries. Finally, Portugal and Spain also benefited from the EU financial assistance 
programs-i.e., the European Regional Development Fund, the Social Fund, the 
Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund, and the newly created Integrated 
Mediterranean Program for agriculture, and later, from the Cohesion Funds. 
EU integration has also allowed both economies to become integrated 
internationally and to modernize, thus securing convergence in nominal terms with 
Europe. One of the major gains of financial liberalization, the significant decline in real 
interest rates, permitted Portugal and Spain to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria. 
Indeed, over three years ago, on January 1, 1999, Spain and Portugal became founding 
members of the Economic and Monetary Union.  Both countries, which as late as 1997 
were considered outside candidates for joining the euro-zone, fulfilled the inflation, 
interest rates, debt, exchange rate, and public deficit requirements established by the 
Maastricht Treaty. This development confirmed the nominal convergence of both 
countries with the rest of the EU. 
Table 2: Compliance of the EMU Convergence Criteria for Portugal, 1986-1997 
    1986  1990  1996  1997 
Inflation*  %  13.1  13.6  2.9  1.9 
General Government Deficit  % GDP  6.4  5.6  3.2  2.5 
General Government Gross Debt  % GDP  68.0  66.9  65.0  61.4 
Long-term Interest rates  %  19.5  16.8  8.6  6.4 
*1986 and 1990: CPI; 1996 and 1997: HCPI (Harmonized Consumer Price Index).  
Sources : European Commission and Portuguese Government. 
 
 
Table 3: Compliance of the EMU Convergence Criteria for Spain, 1993-1997 
Year  Inflation 
(% growth) 
Long-Term 
Interest rate 
Public Sector 
Deficit 
(as % of GDP) 
Government 
Debt 
(as % of GDP) 
1993  4.6  10.2  6.9  60.0 
1994  4.7  10.0  6.3  62.6 
1995  4.7  11.3  7.3  65.5 
1996  3.6  8.7  4.6  70.1 
1997  1.9  6.4  2.6  68.8 
Source: Commission and EMU Reports, March 1998. 
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The EU contributed significantly to this development. Art. 2 of the Treaty of 
Rome established that the common market would "promote throughout the Community 
a harmonious development of economic activities" and therefore lower disparities 
among regions. While regional disparities of the original EC members were not striking 
(with the exception of s outhern Italy), successive enlargements increased regional 
disparities with regard to per capita income, employment, education, productivity, and 
infrastructure. Regional differences led to a north-south divide, which motivated the 
development of EC structural policies. The election of Jacques Delors in 1985 as 
President of the Commission led to renewed efforts to address these imbalances. They 
culminated in the establishment of new cohesion policies that were enshrined in the 
1986 Single European Act, which introduced new provisions making economic and 
social cohesion a new EU common policy. In this regard, the regional development 
policy emerged as an instrument of solidarity between some Europeans and others. 
Since the late 1980s the structural funds became the second largest EU's budgetary item. 
These funds have had a significant impact in regard to the investment needs of poorer 
EU countries (see Table 3) and have made an impressive contribution to growth in 
aggregate demand in these countries (see Table 4): 
Table 4: Gross Fixed Capital Formation versus Community Support Frameworks  
  Percent GFCF Due to EU Support  Percent of GFCF vs. CSFs* 
  1989  1993  1989  1993 
Portugal   7.7  9.9  20.6  27.7 
Spain  2.9  4.1  5.8  8.0 
*CSFs include the private sector expenditures entered into the financing plan of the CSF 
Source: Kesselman et al., European Politics in Transition. Data: EC Commission, Fourth Annual Report 
on the Implementation of the Reform of the Structural Funds, 1992, Com (93) 530, Brussels, 29 October 
1993, 84. 
 
Table 5: Estimated Annual impact of Structural Funds, 1989-1993 
  Average Annual Growth Rate (89-93)  Estimated Impact 
Spain  1.5  0.2 
Portugal   2.6  0.7 
Source: Kesselman et al., European Politics in Transition. Data: EC Commission, Fourth Annual Report 
on the Implementation of the Reform of the Structural Funds, 1992, Com (93) 530, Brussels, 29 October 
1993, 84. 
 
Indeed, the structural and cohesion funds have been the instruments designed by 
the EU to develop social and cohesion policy within the European Union, in order to 
compensate for the efforts that countries with the lowest per capita income relative to 
the EU (Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain) would need to make to comply with the 
nominal convergence criteria. These funds, which amount to just over one-third of the 
EU budget, have contributed significantly to reduce regional disparities and foster 
convergence within the European Union. As a result major infrastructure shortcomings 
have been addressed and road and telecommunication networks have improved 
dramatically both in quantity and quality. In addition, increased spending on education 
and training have contributed to the upgrading of the labour force. In sum, these funds 
have played a prominent role in developing the factors that improve the competitiveness 
and determine the potential growth of the least developed regions of both countries.24 
                                                                   
24 See Sebastián  2001: “Spain in the EU: Fifteen Years May not be Enough,” pp. 25-26. Paper presented 
at the conference From Isolation to Europe: 15 Years of Spanish and Portuguese Membership in the  
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During the 1994-1999 period, EU aid accounted for 1.5% of GDP in Spain and 
3.3% in Portugal. EU funding has allowed rates of public investment to remain 
relatively stable since the mid-1980s. The percentage of public investment financed by 
EU funds has been rising since 1985, to reach average values of 42% for Portugal, and 
15% for Spain. Moreover, the European Commission has estimated that the impact of 
EU structural funds on GDP growth and employment has been significant: GDP rose in 
1999 by 9.9% in Portugal and 3.1% in Spain. In the absence of these funds public 
investment will be greatly affected. 
The combined impetuses of lowering trade barriers, the introduction of the VAT, 
the suppression of import tariffs, the adoption of economic policy rules (such as quality 
standards, or the harmonization of indirect taxes), and the increasing mobility of goods 
and factors of production that comes with greater economic integration, have boosted 
trade and enhanced the openness of the Portuguese and Spanish economies. After 1999, 
this development has been fostered by the lower cost of transactions and greater 
exchange rate stability associated with the single currency. For instance, imports of 
goods and services in real terms as a proportion of GDP rose sharply in Spain (from 
9.6% in 1984 to 13.6% in 1987), while the share of exports shrank slightly (from 16.6% 
in 1984 to 15.8% of GDP in 1987, and from 27% in 1997 to 17.1% of real GDP in 
1992). As a result, the degree of openness of the Portuguese and Spanish economies has 
increased sharply over the last sixteen years. Henceforth, changes to the production 
structure and in the structure of exports, indicators of the degree of competitiveness of 
the Portuguese and Spanish economies (i.e., in terms of human capital skills, stock of 
capital, technological capital) show important improvements, although significant 
differences remain in comparison to the leading developed economies (which confirms 
the need to press ahead with the structural reforms). These achievements verify that in 
terms of economic stability Spain and Portugal are part of Europe's rich club. Their 
income levels, however, remain behind the EU average: 
 
Table 6: Divergence of GDP per Capita 1980-2000 
  1980  1985  1990  2000 
EU Totals  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Spain  74.2  72.5  77.8  81.0 
Portugal   55.0  52.0  55.7  74.0 
 Source: European Union. 
 
This data shows that nominal convergence has advanced at a faster pace than 
real convergence. Indeed, ‘fifteen years have not been long enough.’ Portugal and 
Spain’s European integration has revealed both convergence and divergence, nominal 
and real. Since 1997 inflation in Spain has exceeded the EU average every year. In 
Portugal real convergence has been slowing down each year since 1998, actually 
turning negative in 2000  and with both real and nominal divergence expected to 
increase until 2003. While there is significant controversy over the definition of real 
convergence, most scholars agree that a per capita GDP is a valid reference to measure 
the living standards of a c ountry. This variable, however, has experienced a cyclical 
evolution in the Iberian countries with significant increases during periods of economic 
expansion and sharp decreases during economic recessions. Since the adhesion of Spain 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
European Union. Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University. November 2-3, 
2001.  
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to the EU in 1986 per capita income has increased "only" 11.5 percent and Portugal's 
14.2 percent. Ireland's per capita income, in contrast, has increased 38 percent. Only 
Greece with an increase of 6.8 percent has had a lower real convergence than Spain and 
Portugal. A possible explanation for this development has been the fact that while Spain 
has grown between 1990 and 1998 an average of 2.1%, Portugal has grown 2.5%, and 
Ireland 7.3% over the same period. This growth differential explains the divergences in 
real convergence. Other explanations include: the higher level of unemployment (15.4 
percent in Spain); the low rate of labor participation (i.e., active population over total 
population, which stands at 50 percent, which means that expanding the Spanish labor 
participation rate to the EU average would increase per capita income to 98.2 percent of 
the EU average); the inadequate education of the labor force (i.e. only 28 percent of the 
Spanish potential labor force has at least a high school diploma, in contrast with the EU 
average of 56 percent); low investment in R&D and information technology (the lowest 
in the EU, with Spain ranked 61-spending even less proportionally than many 
developing countries including Vietnam-in the World Economic Forum’s Global Report 
of Information Technologies 2002-2003); and inadequate infrastructures (i.e. road mile 
per 1000 inhabitants in Spain is 47 percent of the EU average and railroads 73 percent). 
The inadequate structure of the labor market with high dismissal costs, a relatively 
centralized collective bargaining system, and a system of unemployment benefits that 
guarantees income instead of fostering job search, have also hindered the convergence 
process.
25 
From a social standpoint, this was a decade and a half of political stability, 
associated with an overall strengthening of the state’s financial and budgetary capacity, 
and with a significant increase in social expenditures. The overall architecture of the 
system has been maintained but there was substantial growth in the amount of benefits, 
with a consequent upgrade of social standards, as well as a movement toward the 
institutionalization of social dialogue, with the signature of social pacts. For instance, in 
1980 expenditure on social protection was 18.1 percent of GDP in Spain and  12.8 
percent of GDP in Portugal, much lower levels than the EU average at that time (24.3%) 
and only higher than that of Greece (9.7%). Since EU accession, despite an increase of 
3.4 percent of the resources dedicated to social protection in Spain (the Spanish welfare 
state grew significantly in size during this period and expenditures on social protection 
over GDP increased by 50 percent), the differential with the EU average has not been 
reduced but has rather increased from 6.2 points in 1980 to 6.8 points in 1997. Portugal, 
starting from lower levels of social protection, has been more successful in reducing the 
differential with the EU average by 50 percent. Spain, however, continues to show a 
higher intensity of protection (per capita expenditure on social protection) than that of 
Portugal.  In the end, the Portuguese and Spanish welfare states have undergone a deep 
process of change in qualitative terms, entailing both the introduction of several 
universal polices and a broader extension of tax-funded  non-contributory benefits and 
services. At the same time, the need to transpose the EEC’s regulatory framework, the 
acquis communitaire (i.e. in the fields of labor and working conditions, equality of 
treatment for women and men, free movement of workers and health, and safety at 
work), and the role played by the structural funds has contributed widely to this 
development. 
 
                                                                   
25 "La convergencia real a paso lento," in El País, February 14, 2000.  
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The 2004 Enlargement: Challenges for Portugal and Spain  
During the European Council that took place in Copenhagen on December 13, 2002, the 
European Union threw open its doors to the east and concluded years of difficult 
negotiations with ten candidate countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus. This historical summit 
marked the last act in the reunification of eastern and western Europe following the end 
of the Cold War. As a result of this round of enlargement the EU will extend from 
Portugal to the borders of Russia (growing from 15 to 25 countries in 2004, provided 
referendums in the candidate countries ratify the accession treaties), and it will have a 
population of 451 million people, a GDP of $8,800 billion, and a GDP per capita of 
$21,410. 26   Not only is this enlargement process historical, but also unique. This is the 
largest single enlargement of the EU since it was established, and as opposed to the 
Greek and Iberian enlargements, this one entails former communist and totalitarian 
states where a civil society, independent institutions, a free press, and entrepreneu rial 
class have been largely absent since the end of WWII. Since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, these countries have built, virtually from scratch, new social, political, 
and economic institutions. This process and the sacrifices involved, as in Iberia, have 
been supported by the prospect of joining Europe. Enlargement will have a large impact 
on the Iberian countries and it raises a number of policy and research issues.   
As we have seen, in sixteen years Portugal and Spain have been able to change 
the terms of accession and to negotiate compensatory mechanisms to mitigate the 
negative consequences of unfavorable accession treaties (particularly for Spain). In the 
end, integration has had a very positive outcome, and both countries have benefited 
greatly from European funds and policies. For instance, in 2001 Spain was allocated 
nearly 63% of the EU’s structural funds budget ($27.8bn). Since the Iberian countries 
are major beneficiaries of the EU re-distributive funds, the entrance of central and 
eastern European countries (some, like Poland, with large agricultural sectors) will 
likely result in a reduction of the resources that the Iberian countries currently receive 
from European funds. Structural and agricultural funds will be available, at least 
through  2006. After, there will be  a new scenario  characterized by increasing 
competition for European funds, foreign direct investment, trade, and migration 
patterns. These developments will force the Spanish and Portuguese governments (as 
well as the economic actors) to re-evaluate current strategies and policies. In addition, 
enlargement will bring new demands from the new eastern European members in a 
context in which the richer countries are committed to maintain (or even reduce if 
possible) the existing budgetary ceilings, which currently stand at 1.27% of the EU 
GDP. This will likely result in a shift of resources to the East, which means that both 
Portugal and Spain will receive fewer funds from the EU budget and that, hence, they 
will contribute more financially to the European Union.  
It has been argued that “the main challenge confronting the Spanish economy in 
the short run will be competition from the central and eastern European countries after 
the enlargement of the European Union.”
27 The major source of concern is that these 
                                                                   
26 Today the EU is rich and homogeneous with a population of 376m, a GDP of $8.660bn and a GDP per 
capita of $23,550. The richest EU country is Luxembourg with a per capita GDP of $27,470 and its 
poorest Greece with $16,860. In contrast the new member states have a combined population of almost 
75m (Poland accounts for 39m) and their GDP per head is only an average of $10,550. See Martin Wolf, 
“Europe risks destruction to widen peace and prosperity,” in Financial Times, December 11, 2002, p. 15. 
27 Sebastián 2001, p. 22.  
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countries specialize in labor-intensive and low-to-medium technology products (such as 
machinery, electrical equipment, textile goods and automobiles), sectors that make up a 
large proportion of Portuguese and Spanish trade (i.e., 7.4%, 7.3%, 4.5% and 20%, 
respectively, of total Spanish exports to the EU-15), and in which competitiveness via 
prices is of particular importance. At the same time, in the central and eastern European 
countries, labor costs are between 20% and  60% lower than those of the European 
Union. Therefore, there is the possibility that enlargement could lead to a loss of market 
share for Iberian products in the countries of the EU (which is the market for 70% of 
Spanish exports). However, according to Sebastián (2001) a detailed analysis suggests 
that a negative outcome is not warranted. First, the EU has signed bilateral agreements 
with each of these countries since the beginning of the 1990s to liberalize trade (except 
for agricultural goods). This development has resulted in a significant increase of 
exports to the EU from these countries (an average of 12%, during the period 1989-
1999). Despite this increase of imports from central and  Eastern Europe, Sebastián 
points out that “Spanish exports to Europe expanded at a robust 13.4% average annual 
rate over this period.” Second, the composition of EU imports from the new candidate 
countries and from southern European countries is similar to the import structure from 
other developing countries. Third, these countries compete in market segments of a 
different quality as reflected by differences in unit values (export prices). Therefore, the 
direct impact on Portuguese and Spanish exports to third markets resulting from EU 
enlargement is likely to be modest. F inally, Sebastián points out that “the 
competitiveness of Spanish products could be bolstered in the short run as a result of 
real exchange rate appreciation of the currencies of aspirant countries, caused by higher 
rates of inflation while nominal convergence consolidates, and in the medium term, 
because of the reduction of wage differentials as real convergence progresses.” 28 
 At the same time, an additional concern is the impact that enlargement will have 
on the funds that the Iberian countries receive from the European Union. Since the new 
member states are significantly poorer, enlargement will reduce the EU’s average gross 
domestic product per capita between 10-20%, and hence the per capita income of Spain 
and to a lesser extent Portugal will be closer to the EU average (this is the so-called 
‘statistical effect’). This means that many Iberian regions will no longer be eligible for 
aid, as funds are switched to the new member states. Under existing rules, only the 
regions with an average per capita income of less that 75% of the EU average (which 
includes practically all the regions of the new member states) qualify, under Objective 
1, to receive structural funds. In addition, only the countries with an average income of 
less than 90% of the European average have access to the Cohesion Funds (which 
would include all the new member countries- i.e. the average income in Poland is 40%, 
36% in Lithuania, and 78% in Cyprus). Regional funds currently represent 34.5% of the 
EU budget and CAP funds 45 percent. Hence, as a result of enlargement there will be 
three groups of countries: first a group of poorer countries will be integrated by eight of 
the ten new members (all except Cyprus and Slovenia) with average per capita incomes 
of 42% of that of the EU and 21% of the population. A second group will be integrated 
by five countries (Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain) with an average per 
capita income close to 90% of the Union and 13% of the population. The last group will 
be integrated by the richer countries of the Union, with 66% of the population and an 
average income of 115% of that of the European Union. 
                                                                   
28 Sebastián 2001, p. 22.  
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  Hence, many Iberian regions will not qualify for structural and cohesion funds. 
For instance, at present 11 of Spain’s 17 regions (Extremadura, Andalusia, Galicia, 
Asturias, Castile-León, Castile-La Mancha, Murcia, Valencia, Ceuta, Melilla, and under 
special conditions Cantabria) receive EU structural funds because their per capita 
incomes are below the 75% threshold and, hence, are included as Objective 1 territories. 
After the 2004 enlargement, however, only four Spanish regions (Andalusia-67.4%, 
Extremadura-58.4%, Castile-La Mancha-73.6%, and Galicia-71.3%) will remain below 
75% of the EU average income, which will allow them to qualify for European funds 
under the same conditions. In addition, the expected entrance of Bulgaria and Romania 
in 2007 (the two poorest countries of the Union with per capita incomes of 27% and 
26% of the EU’s respectively) will increase further the average of the curren t members 
and only two regions (Andalusia and Extremadura) will qualify. 29 
The EU countries and the Commission are discussing mechanisms to allow for a 
progressive phasing out of these funds to prevent their sudden cancellation as a result of 
the ‘statistical effect’. The affected countries (including Spain and Portugal) are 
suggesting proposals to increase the ceilings above 75% to have access to the funds, or 
to establish different access criteria for current members and new ones. In the end, it is 
very likely that in the near future both Iberian countries (particularly Spain) will become 
net contributors to the EU budget. Hence, the political, electoral and budgetary 
implications of these developments are taunting and unprecedented. As we have seen, 
the European Commission has estimated that the impact of EU structural funds on GDP 
growth and employment has been significant: GDP rose in 1999 by 9.9% in Portugal 
and 3.1% in Spain. In the absence of these funds public investment will be greatly 
affected. 
Moreover, Spain and Portugal will have to further speed up the reform of their 
productive and economic structures to increase the productivity of their labor force-
which is still significantly lower than the EU average. As we have seen, as a result of 
the enlargement process Portugal and Spain will face increasing competition for their 
main nonagricultural exports—such as clothing, textiles, and leather. Problems should 
be anticipated in labor-intensive industries given the relatively low level of wages in the 
central and eastern European states. Central and eastern European countries with lower 
wages produce all these goods at cheaper costs. Therefore, these countries will attract 
foreign investment in sectors where traditionally Portugal and Spain have been favored. 
Moreover, since the new ten members have lower labor-costs it is likely that 
manufacturing plants currently producing in Iberia will be tempted to move production 
to eastern Europe (this is already happening, the car manufacturer Seat moved a plant 
from Pamplona, Spain, to Slovakia in 2001).  In this context it will be important for the 
leaders of both Iberian countries to continue pushing for a shift toward more capital -
intensive industries that will require greater skills in the labor force but rel ying on 
standard technology (e.g. chemicals, vehicles, steel and metal manufacturers).   
Enlargement, paradoxically, may help in this process because it will also bring 
significant opportunities to the Iberian countries (and the other EU members). Indeed, 
Portuguese and Spanish products will now have access to new markets and cheaper 
labor, and may help improve competitiveness. This may also allow for the development 
of more diversified investment patterns to reduce risks. Spanish (and to a lesser extent 
                                                                   
29 “Sólo dos comunidades de las 11 actuales podrán recibir fondos europeos en 2007” [Only two of the 
current 11 communities will be able to receive European funds in 2007] in El País , January 24, 2003.   
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Po rtuguese) firms have invested very heavily in Latin America over the last decade. 
Current political and economic uncertainties in Latin American countries, however, 
suggest that diversification to eastern and central Europe may be an appropriate strategy 
for Iberian firms, which are still underrepresented vis-à-vis companies from the larger 
EU countries (i.e., Spanish investment in these countries currently stands at merely 
200m euros).  
In terms of the agricultural impact of enlargement, Iberian farmers should also 
expect to face serious adjustment problems, particularly given the fact that membership 
in the EU will imply full membership in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the 
new ten members, and that agricultural prices in the central and eastern European states 
(particularly in Poland) are in general lower than those in Iberia. First, when barriers for 
eastern European states’ agricultural products are dropped, market prices in Iberia may 
decline given the new entrants’ lower prices and their potential for expansion of 
production.  In addition, in the case of some agricultural products, EU membership is 
expected to provide incentives to increase production in the new states. Finally, 
membership is expected to open the new member states’ markets to substitutes, thus 
resulting in surplus disposal that would have to be supported by the European budget. 
These concerns have been reflected in the final agreements.  
In addition, in the next decade CAP funds will be redesigned and most likely 
reduced. The EU leaders agreed in October of 2002 to effectively freeze CAP spending 
until 2013 (it is supposed to increase merely 1% after 2006, well below inflation levels). 
Furthermore, in order to facilitate enlargement (and the WTO Doha world trade round) 
the European Commission  proposed a plan in January of 2003 to reform EU farming 
including: the elimination of subsidies linked to production; the channeling of subsidies 
into rural development funds, the reduction of payments to big and medium-sized farms 
to achieve fairer distribution; the cutting of payments to farmers if they fail to follow 
new criteria on food safety, environment and animal welfare; and finally the lowering of 
prices at which the EU guarantees to buy grain and dairy products. Spain and Portugal 
(among other countries, particularly France, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Austria) remain 
bitterly opposed to these plans. The reduction of the CAP’s funds for many Iberian 
farmers will most likely result in the co-financing of agricultural policies (something 
that the Portuguese and Spanish governments have not been willing to consider so far). 
Furthermore, the EU enlargement will likely result in a shift toward the north, 
and the so-called Mediterranean bloc (including Italy and Greece), which shares 
substantive similarities and interests, will carry less weight. Indeed, enlargement will 
shift the center of gravity of the EU to the east and the north, which will have economic 
and political implications for the Iberian countries because it will reduce the v oting 
power of Portugal and Spain (and the Mediterranean bloc in general), while changing 
the cultural character of the European Union. In a Europe of 25 members the 
institutional powers and influence of Spain and Portugal will be further diluted. First, 
Iberian votes will be less decisive in European institutions such as the European 
Commission, the Council and the Parliament. Second (and this is currently under 
consideration by the ongoing European Convention), enlargement is also likely to result 
in the extension of qualified majority voting to additional policy areas that until this 
time had to be decided by unanimity. Finally, the shift in budgetary priorities and the 
limited resources will also mean that some of the policy priorities that Portugal and 
Spain have defended within the European Union, such as support for Latin America or  
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Northern Africa-the Magreb, are likely to receive less attention and resources (and there 
is even the possibility that they may no longer be European policies).
30 
Finally, from an economic convergence standpoint, given the existing income 
and productivity differentials with the richer countries, regardless of enlargement the 
Iberian states will have to continue increasing their living standards to bring them closer 
to the current EU average. For this to happen, it is necessary that their economies grow 
faster than the other rich European countries. This will require further liberalization of 
their labor structures (both internal and external), as well as increasing competition 
within their service markets, and developing a better utilization of their productive 
resources. In addition, convergence will also demand institutional reforms in R&D 
policies, in education, improvement of civil infrastructures, as well as further 
innovation, an increase in business capabilities, more investment in information 
technology, and better and more efficient training systems. Finally, a successful 
convergence policy will also demand a debate about the role of public investment and 
welfare programs in both countries. In the Iberian countries increases in public 
expenditures to develop their welfare state have caused imbalances in their national 
accounts. Yet, both countries still spend significantly less in this area than their 
European neighbors (i.e. Spain spends 6.3 points less on welfare policies than the EMU 
average). Effective real convergence would demand not only effective strategies and 
policies, but also a strong commitment on the part of Spanish and Portuguese citizens to 
this objective. 
31 
 
Challenges for the New Member States 
Political factors lay  at the heart of the Portuguese and Spanish decision to join the 
European Union. Both countries wanted to strengthen their new democratic regimes and 
end the relative isolation that they had faced during the authoritarian years. The cases of 
Portugal and Spain demonstrate how important the democratic pre-requirement for 
membership has been to the transition to and consolidation of democracy in all three 
countries. Yet, the differences between 1986 and 2002 are remarkable. Portugal and 
Spain now have advanced capitalist economies, strong and modern states, social 
institutions supportive of markets, well-developed civil societies, trade unions and 
interest groups, and a high degree of integration between the two Iberian economies that 
has resulted in a cluster of interests.  
When we contrast this situation with the status of eastern European countries 
and compare the challenges that the Iberian countries faced in the 1980s with the ones 
that the new states from central and Eastern  Europe will face, the latter look far more 
daunting. In central and eastern Europe there are barely functional market economies 
and unstable democracies. In addition, none of the new members has a previous 
tradition of democracy (except the Czech Republic). Furthermore, in the EU we now 
have the Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union. Finally, the current 
economic and political climate (particularly after 9/11) will make enlargement even 
                                                                   
30 For a discussion on the effects of enlargement in Spain see José Ignacio Torreblanca, “Por fin, la 
ampliación: la Unión Europea tras el Consejo de Copenhague,” [Finally enlargement: the EU after the 
Copenhagen Summit], mimeo,  Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, 
December 19, 2002. 
31 "La convergencia real a paso lento," in El País, February 14, 2000.  
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more difficult. Therefore, the  current enlargement process is very different and more 
problematic.  
As in Iberia, the new member states are transforming their political and 
economic systems, and have adapted their regulations to the  acquis communitaire. 
However, the costs of this transformation for the new ten have been so far even higher 
than in Iberia. Unemployment has increased up to 40% in some regions, and taxes have 
been increased by up to 10% as a result of the introduction of the VAT. Economic and 
institutional transformations have exposed the weaknesses of these governments and, in 
many cases they have led to the return of former Communists to the governments of 
these countries, which has hindered the reform process.  
Joining the EC was much simpler in 1986 than it is today. Since the 1986 Iberian 
enlargement the number of EU members has increased to 15, the Single Market and 
EMU have been introduced, and the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties (with the 
incorporation of new policy areas such as justice and home affairs) have been ratified. 
Therefore, the complexity of the acquis communitaire has increased dramatically and 
hence the difficulties that new members are likely to experience meeting it are much 
higher. Moreover, the differing cultural and historical experiences of the new entrants 
will complicate the convergence process towards a common European identity. 32 
In addition, the economic and political environments are substantially different 
and even more complex. Indeed, the timing of accession was an important contributing 
factor to the success of Iberian integration. Not only were the Iberian economies market 
economies with fully institutionalized market mechanisms in place (with the parenthesis 
of the failed revolutionary attempt in Portugal in the mid 1970s), but also the Iberian 
enlargement coincided with the end of the economic recession, the lowering of oil 
prices, the beginning of a period of economic expansion within the European 
economies, and a new period of détente between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. Current economic (the worldwide recession) and political uncertainties (the so-
called war on terrorism, the conflict in the Middle East, the Wars in Iraq), combined 
with the economic difficulties that Germany and other EU member estates (as well as 
the United States and Japan) are currently experiencing will make integration far more 
difficult for new members.  
Furthermore, there are also significant differences in economic performance in 
eastern Europe. Given the scope of the new enlargement process and the disparities and 
geographical distance among the new entrants, harmonization is likely to be even more 
difficult. Some of these differences can be explained in terms of geographical proximity 
to the EU countries, but this factor does not explain everything. 
Domestically, the integration prospects in  Eastern Europe are far more 
complicated. In the new members economic modernization will be the result of a 
systemic challenge, not merely a consequence of an adjustment process like in the 
Iberian countries. Hence, the economic benefits will be lower and will take longer to 
materialize. Moreover, increasing nationalism in these countries will also hinder the 
cultural effects of integration. The new member states will face problems similar to 
those of previous entrants. Cameron (2002) has argued that the new member states will 
face four major domestic challenges: first, the ability to reform their administrative and 
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institutional settings to develop the capacity to implement the acquis; second, the 
willingness to deepen the necessary reforms to transform their economies into 
functional market systems; third, the ability to reduce unemployment levels while 
addressing the structural imbalances of their economies; and finally, the political 
challenges to finalize the transition to membership in face of increasing opposition 
within (and outside) their countries regarding enlargement. 
The ten new entrants will have to undergo reform of nationalized industries, 
tackle corruption, strengthen their judiciary system (a key  problem in these countries is 
the lack of strong courts) and their administrative capacities to implement the EU rules 
(i.e. on food safety), eliminate conflicting tax rules, put an end to political cronyism and 
politically driven appointments to the civil service and public companies (there is 
widespread politization of public-sector jobs), reform their public finances, strengthen 
their weak economic management, reduce industry’s subsidies, reform and in many 
cases privatize their large and outmoded public companies (i.e. in Poland 2,000 state 
owned companies generate one fourth of employment and GDP), introduce competition 
in many economic sectors, improve the overall business climate (by promoting 
privatization, fair taxation, deregulation, limit abuses to market power, and investment), 
strengthen financial regulation, develop transparent procurement procedures, and 
uphold EU rules. One of the consequences of concerns over the ability of these 
countries to move ahead in these areas (and also an outcome of Greece’s integration 
experience) has been the inclusion of so-called safeguard clauses into the accession 
treaties to allow the EU to suspend privileges (such as structural funds and farm aid) in 
certain areas if the new member states breach the single market rules. Moreover, EU 
enlargement will increase competition and force the liberalization of economic sectors 
in these states, and the CAP will bring not just subsidies but also more regulation and 
competition. Finally, the ability of the new member states to prepare viable projects to 
qualify to be partially financed with EU funds and to raise matching funds, will also 
determine their success in capitalizing on EU accession.  
Furthermore, the levels of financial support from European policies (cohesion 
and structural funds, or the CAP) will also be far more limited for the new member 
states compared with previous enlargement processes. The new accession treaty 
provides 40.8bn euros in EU aid for the ten states for the period 2004-2006 (and an 
additional 1bn for Poland from regional aid). This represents just 0.15% of the EU 
GDP. However, this figure is gross and the net transfer of funds will be even smaller 
after taking account of the contributions of the new member states to EU funds (with 
some analysts estimating that it could be as little as 12bn euros-or just 4% of the EU 
budget, or 0.05% of the EU GDP). Since the average per capita income of the new 
member states is 44% of the EU average and their GDP is just 5% of the EU’s GDP, 
these funds will be hardly enough to help them close this gap. With this level of support 
it has been estimated that it will take over 20 years to narrow this gap. To put these 
figures in perspective: Greece has received more than 35bn euros from the EU since 
accession, and during the period 1994-1999, EU aid accounted for 1.5% of GDP in 
Spain and 3.3% in Portugal.  
These difficulties will be further aggravated by the fact that the new members’ 
farmers will have to wait until 2013 to receive the same level of support that farmers 
from current members receive (they will start at 25% of current EU levels in 2004). This 
is critical for countries in which agriculture still represents a large proportion of their 
economies (58.9% percent of the Polish territory is devoted to agricultural operations,  
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and two out of ten Poles are farmers, contributing only 3.4% to the country’s GDP). All 
of these factors fall within a hard economic context in which two out of ten Poles are 
unemployed, in Slovenia unemployment is 19.4%, and it is  16.5% in Lithuania. In 
addition, public deficits are also high (5.6% of GDP in Slovakia and 5.5% in the Czech 
Republic). 
A key additional concern is the increasing growth of disenchantment within the 
new member states over EU integration. While a few years ago support was widespread 
and the assumption within the EU was that the biggest obstacles would come inside the 
existing union (according to Eurobarometer in 2001 only 44% of Europeans supported 
enlargement and expressed concerns over the costs of admitting the new states, as well 
as fears about labor migration), disillusionment over the accession conditions and the 
costs of structural reforms necessary for EU membership as well as fears of being 
swamped by foreign capital and influence have led to increasing discontent among the 
citizens of the new members states, growing Euroskepticism and the rise of anti-EU 
voices. Sensitive topics such as domestic issues (i.e., high levels of unemployment and 
the unpopularity of local governments), farm subsidies, Cyprus, immigration, the Benes 
decrees, the Sudetenland dispute, or possible demands from former owners of property 
expropriated by Nazis and Communists in some countries, have been further soured by 
the global economic slowdown and the accession conditions (particularly the decision to 
limit migration during the first seven years). According to Eurobarometer, support for 
enlargement is running at about 65% (with support ranging from 80% in Hungary and 
60% in Poland, to barely 50% in the Czech Republic), but given increasing political 
resentment, there is a serious risk that one (or more) of the new members may vote “no” 
in the forthcoming accession referendums, particularly if voters decide to stay away 
from the polls. Approval is no longer a certainty. 33 
Theses challenges are compounded by the uncertainties over the course of the 
institutional reforms of the European  Union. The risk of institutional decision-making 
gridlock is a real possibility. The logistical issues of ruling an institution with 25 
members will be daunting, from logistical issues, to languages, to decision-making 
processes. One of the key questions is what kind of institutional reforms will result from 
the ongoing European Convention. Some of the outcomes from the C onvention may 
include: more qualified  majority voting (i.e. over issues such as taxation, or justice and 
home affairs), EP co-decision, a new system of EU presidency that will eliminate the 
current system based on a six-month  ro tation among member states, and an increasing 
role for national parliaments. While some of the larger countries (France and Britain) 
are pushing for a stronger EU presidency, the smallest states are arguing in favor of a 
strong European Commission that will act as its biggest ally and protector (but it will 
also require reform because 25 commissioners may be too many). It will be in the best 
interest of the new members to uphold the current decision making system based on 
consensus as opposed to majority vote with a strong European Commission. In the end, 
the key will be to build a Constitution of Europe that reflects the vision of the peoples of 
Europe. Unfortunately, for decades most governments across Europe have been treating 
public opinion as an obstacle to be circumvented or simply ignored. Consequently, 
voters’ skepticism has grown and European citizens are getting tired of being told what 
to do by political elites in matters concerning the European Union. Politicians can 
ignore this at their own peril. 
                                                                   
33 See Stefan Wagstyl “EU accession states woo the voters,” in Financial Times, January 9, 2003, p. 4.  
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Iberian Lessons for Post-Communist Europe
34 
The Iberian enlargement process provides useful feedback for the ongoing process, not 
only for negotiation strategies, but also in terms of the consequences of membership.35 
What are the Iberian lessons for post-Communist Europe? 
First, any negotiations (even with the EU) should not be based on an “us versus 
them” approach, but instead on a “them versus them” that will allow the new member 
states to take advantage of divisions among current member countries. Poland has 
played this strategy quite skillfully so far. In addition, although the new members (like 
Portugal and Spain before) will find themselves on the same side on many issues (i.e., 
on social questions, on the EU structural funds, and on the concept of cohesion), each 
new member should develop its own ad hoc coalitions with other members based on 
common interests. The Iberian experience shows that despite similar interests and 
objectives, after sixteen years there has not been a consistent approach to EU 
negotiations between Portugal and Spain. They have often cooperated, but they have 
also worked separately and with other EU members. The Portuguese and Spaniards 
choose alliances depending on the issue at stake. 
Furthermore, one of the most important lessons from the Iberian enlargement is 
that the terms of accession are  not always final. Renegotiations after accession are 
possible and compensatory mechanisms can be developed. Therefore whatever the 
accession terms for 2004-2006, the focus of the new member states should be on 2006, 
when the EU will start its next seven-year budget period.
36  The focal point should be on 
accession economics instead of development economics. The EU will pursue stability 
and homogenization, but the new member countries will want to promote growth. In 
this regard, the Iberian experience shows that the center of attention of the new 
countries should be on finding the best ways to maximize the benefits of membership 
once they are in. A selfish strategy that would look only at their particular needs is also 
bound to fail. The new members also need  to look at their potential contributions to the 
EU and the model of European integration that they want to build. Paraphrasing 
President Kennedy, they should ponder, not only what the EU can do for them but also 
what they can do for the European Union. This should not be a zero-sum-game but 
instead a positive-sum-game. 
                                                                   
34 I would like to thank Jeffrey Kopstein, Ramón de Miguel, Kalypso Nicolaidis, George Ross, and 
Franciso Seixas da Costa for their valuable comments during the last roundtable of the conference: From 
Isolation to Europe: 15 Years of Spanish and Portuguese Membership in the European Union. Minda de 
Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University. November 2 -3, 2001. Their comments 
inform this issue. 
35 Some observers have noted that these new members may learn even more from Greece than from 
Portugal and Spain. In Greece for instance, the government was reluctant to cede control of vital 
economic sectors,  it was behind in consumer protection, environmental and competition policies, and 
corruption was a systemic problem. In addition Greece had weak civil institutions, which slowed the 
convergence process. For years Greece squandered the opportunities of EU membership through poor 
fiscal management, corruption, political cronyism, justice mismanagement, and misadministration and 
mismanagement of domestic and European funds. While fiscal discipline has been achieved, the change 
of attitudes and values is still a pending issue. See “Is Poland the new Greece? Why Warsaw’s entry into 
the European Union may be rough,” in Financial Times . Monday December 9, 2002, p.11. 
36 This agreement allowed Spain to sustain a positive trade balance with the Ten of 305,000 million 
pesetas in 1984. At this time, Spanish exports to the EC were 43.3% of the total exports, while imports 
from the EC represented 32.3% of total imports. These favorable results for Spain were negative for the 
EC, which tried on the accession negotiations to correct this situation. See Fernández Guerrero et al 1989, 
pp. 145-59.  
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Thirdly, the experience of Portugal and Spain demonstrates the limits of peer 
pressure and the ability of the  acquis communitaire to force change. In successive 
enlargement overviews, the Commission has pointed out the need of the new ten to 
combat corruption, economic crime, strengthen independent judiciaries, and develop the 
capacity to implement the acquis. However, both Spain and Portugal (and Greece) have 
had (and still face) problems in all of these areas.  
The Iberian enlargement also illustrates that patterns of migration can be 
reversed. Both Spain and Portugal were made to wait for accession in the 1980s, partly 
over immigration fears  that never did materialize. As in 1986, the new treaties of 
accession have established a period of seven years for the new member states of central 
and Eastern Europe. Fears of uncontrolled migration were not substantiated after 1986, 
(or even after the seven year transition period). On the contrary, as a consequence of 
improved economic conditions in Iberia, one of the key results of EU access was that by 
1995 there were 100,000 fewer Spaniards and 110,000 fewer Portuguese living in other 
EU member states than before enlargement. Furthermore, the reverse process took place 
when thousands of Europeans (particularly from Germany and Britain) migrated to 
Spain. Such concerns are likely to be unfounded again with the new member states. 
The European Commission estimates that 70,000 to 150,000 workers (out of a 
population of 350 million people) could migrate from Eastern Europe to the current EU 
states. This is hardly a large number. The continuing existence of language, cultural, 
and structural barriers will most likely continue hindering labor mobility in an enlarged 
Europe. In addition, the rapid economic growth of the eastern European countries 
(particularly compared to some of the current EU members, like Germany) is likely to 
have the same effect that it had on migration patterns in Spain and Portugal after 1986. 
Finally, although it is likely that migration will cause difficulties in particular regions 
(particularly on the eastern border zones of Austria and Germany) and industries, the 
problem my not be too much migration from the east but instead too little. Given the 
ageing of the EU population and the low fertility rates it will be important to facilitate 
the migration of more young people from eastern European countries. In the end, 
instead of displacing local people from the labor market or lowering wages, immigrants 
from the new member states will contribute to the host economy by adding value, 
creating jobs, and pushing up wages because these workers will now be able to work 
legally (several hundred thousand currently work illegally in the EU).
37 
It is also necessary to note that the success of the Iberian countries was largely 
influenced by the support that they received from the EU funds. During the 1994-1999 
period, EU aid accounted for 1.5% of GDP in Spain and 3.3% in Portugal. EU funding 
has allowed rates of public investment to remain relatively stable since the mid-1980s. 
The percentage of public investment financed by EU funds has been rising since 1985, 
to reach average values of 42% for Portugal, and 15% for Spain. Moreover, the 
European Commission has estimated that the impact of EU structural funds on GDP 
growth and employment has been significant:  in 1999,  GDP rose by 9.9% in Portugal 
and 3.1% in Spain. These funds, which amount to just over one-third of the EU budget, 
have contributed significantly to reduce regional disparities and foster convergence 
within the European Union. As a result major infrastructure shortcomings have been 
                                                                   
37 See “UK leads way on opening borders to new workers,” in Financial Times , Friday December 13, 
2002, p.2; and “Fears of big move west may be unfounded,” in Financial Times, Tuesday De cember 2, 
2002, p. 4.   
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addressed and road and telecommunication networks have improved dramatically both 
in quantity and quality. In addition, increasing spending on education and training have 
contributed to the upgrading of the labor force. In sum, these funds have played a 
prominent role in developing the factors that improve the competitiveness and 
determine the potential growth of the least developed regions of both countries.38 We 
have seen, however that new member states should not expect the same level of aid. 
Therefore, adjustment costs will be higher and it will take them longer to catch up. 
 Yet, while acknowledging the critical role played by EU funds in the success of 
Iberian integration, it is also important to stress that successful integration is not only a 
budgetary issue. On the contrary, the Iberian experience demonstrates that the main 
benefits of integration derive from the opportunities that it generates in terms of trade 
and foreign direct investment. Portugal and Spain show that a critical factor to 
determine the final outcome of integration will depend upon the pattern of investment, 
which would bring about important dynamic effects. Dynamic effects should be more 
important than static ones. Indeed, the process of opening to international trade 
improves potential for growth, lowers production costs, and reduces the risk premium in 
response to a brighter macroeconomic outlook, which results from economic reforms. 
These developments help account for the increases in FDI in Portugal and Spain (where 
it reached a peak of 2.7% of GDP in 1990). FDI, in turn, has had very positive 
implications for the Iberian economies because it has facilitated the transmission of 
technology, has paved the way for advances in productivity and, therefore, it has 
fostered an increase in the potential GDP growth of both economies. 
The difficulties that the Iberian economies experienced in the early 1990s 
provide an additional lesson for new members, namely that “automatic pilots” do not 
work. The credibility of monetary and economic authorities cannot be built by attaching 
it to semi-rigid institutional mechanisms (like Spain and to a lesser extent Portugal tried 
to do in the late 1980s and early 1990s with European Monetary System [EMS] 
membership). On the contrary, credibility has to be earned through the adequate 
management of existing discretionary powers. In addition, the Iberian EMU integration 
shows that the consolidation of integration processes is contingent on an adequate 
coordination of macroeconomic policies among members prior to the (possible) 
adoption of a common currency. In Portugal and Spain EU integration has required a set 
of measures including increasing competition, privatization of public enterprises, 
industrial restructuring, and deregulation. These measures have translated into 
efficiency gains, which have been reinforced by a more stable macroeconomic 
framework. At the same time, lower inflation and fiscal consolidation have led to lower 
real (and nominal) interest rates, which, in turn, have resulted in higher sustainable 
growth. However, there have also been short-term costs associated with monetary 
integration. Indeed, the losses of the exchange rate and of monetary sovereignty require 
a process of nominal convergence and fiscal consolidation, as well as higher cyclical 
correlation for euro membership to be successful. This should be taken into account for 
future eastern European economies.  
The Iberian enlargement also shows that prior to monetary integration, 
candidates must carry out a process of modernization and nominal convergence without 
fixing their exchange rates. An additional lesson is that financial institutional reform 
does not necessarily force institutional changes in other areas (i.e. the labor market, or 
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fiscal policies). The virtual collapse of the European Monetary System in 1992 caused 
in part by successive devaluations of the Iberian currencies showed the limits of 
financial and monetary instruments to impose institutional reforms in other areas and to 
balance domestic and external economic objectives. Institutional reforms require actions 
and policies on the part of the governments that are willing to pay  the short-term 
political price for unpopular policies. The jury is still out regarding the domestic 
institutional impact of Economic and Monetary Union. 
One of the important lessons from the Iberian enlargement should be that 
economic success drives public opinion. In Iberia the greatest consensus elicited toward 
the EU is largely instrumental. The image of a “European Community” among Iberian 
people is very weak. Indeed, they perceive the EU as an economic community, not so 
much as a community of Europeans. The Eurobarometer and CIS polling data show that 
the perceptions from Iberian citizens about the personal and collective benefits derived 
from EU membership are one of the key factors that help explain their attitudes towards 
the process of European integration. Hence, approval of Europe seems to coincide with 
economic cycles: low during economic recessions, and high during periods of economic 
growth. 
Finally, while Portugal and Spain had pursued feverishly their integration in the 
Community, the effects of EU integration have not always been favorable to both 
countries. As we have seen, both in manufacturing and in agriculture, there has been 
both trade diversion and trade creation, which implied more adjustment problems, since 
greater import penetration led to a contraction in domestic production. This was 
particularly true in the case of the Iberian manufacturing sector. Factors such as the 
behavior of the exchange rate, or the strategies of multinational companies with 
subsidiaries in both countries also played a critical role in the final outcome of 
integration.  This analysis proves that the expected static effects, which were not always 
favorable to Spain and Portugal, should not be the main economic expectation behind 
the ten’s entry  into the European Union. Based on the Iberian experience dynamic 
effects, on the contrary, provide an important rationale to support integration. Over the 
long run, they will affect the rate of economic growth of the new member states, which 
will be largely influenced by investment patterns, by the efficiency with which these 
resources are used, and finally, by their distributional effects among regions. 
 
Conclusions 
While the short-term outlook can be difficult, the economies of the candidate countries 
have already been  transformed by the prospects of EU entry. From an economic 
standpoint, although central and eastern European countries have low GDP per capita, 
they are growing very quickly (and certainly faster than most of the EU economies). For 
the new members a key benefit will be additional FDI (currently 78% of the investment 
in the ten member states comes from the EU). Market oriented reforms have also taken 
place over the last decade in all ten countries and they have been compounded by 
private investment, including foreign direct investment. As a result the private sector in 
many of the ten countries is flourishing and showing resourcefulness in competitive 
markets. The European Commission has estimated that membership could help raise the 
annual economic growth rate of these ten countries by an extra 1.3 to 23.1 percent. In 
addition, these countries already compare well in surveys of global competitiveness vis- 
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à-vis EU members (i.e., the World Economic Forum [WEF] ranks Hungary and Estonia 
above Portugal, and Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Poland above Greece). Long-
term prospects for growth are also good because of the region’s low-cost labor, its 
skilled workers, and its proximity to western European export markets. These countries 
have become quite flexible because the drive to dismantle the communist apparatus has 
led to the development of a more open administrative environment than in may EU 
members and more labor flexibility.
39  Moreover, producers from the new member states 
will now have access not only to their respective national markets but also to the 
European market. This will offer incentives for investment and will allow for the 
development of economies of scale, which in turn will result in more competitive 
products in the European markets. Furthermore, the entry of these new states to the EU 
will make their citizens European citizens, thus ending some of the discrimination that 
these emigrants are currently suffering. Finally, access to the EU cohesion and structural 
funds will facilitate the accession of new members. Indeed, the structural and cohesion 
funds, and the CAP (limited as they will be) are powerful support instruments to 
mitigate the negative impact of accession.  
For the Iberian countries and the new central and eastern European member 
states the EU symbolizes modernization and democracy. In Iberia, the European 
integration process has facilitated the re-incorporation of both countries  into the 
international arena, has contributed to the legitimacy of the new democratic regimes, 
has acted as a buffer in controversial issues (such as the process of decentralization in 
Spain, or the implementation of economic reforms), and has facilitated and accelerated 
the process of convergence and modernization of financial, commercial, and 
manufacturing structures. The idea of Europe became a driving force that moved 
reforms forward and it was a fundamental factor for bringing together political 
stabilization, economic recovery, and democratic consolidation. As we look to future 
research agendas, it is important to stress that while the majority of the research in this 
project has focused on the policy effects and the influence of EU policies on the Iberian 
countries, it is also imperative to study the impact of EU membership on domestic 
institutions.40 
Despite all the significant progress accomplished over the last sixteen years, the 
Iberian countries still have considerable ground to cover. At a time in which the 
European Commission is reporting that the EU is ‘losing the battle on competitiveness,’ 
in a list of 44 indicators, including economic performance, reform, employment, and 
research, Portugal and Spain (together with Greece) are among the worst countries in 
the majority of the areas.
41  Lack of political willingness to reform and sluggish growth 
                                                                   
39 For instance, according to the WEF starting a company in Poland takes 3 permits against an average of 
5 in France and 10 in Italy. See “Into the west,” in The Financial Times, July 22, 2002. Spain in contrast, 
is listed by the European Commission as the country in which the cost to create a business are the highest 
(1,572 euros when the EU average is 250), and the second in which the process is the slowest (24 days, 
twice as much than the EU average, only Italy is behind with 35 days). According to the Commission 
some of the key difficulties include: administrative barriers, difficult access to financing, bankruptcy 
provisions, employment protection, discrimination against women, and inadequate education and training. 
40 See Morlino 2002. 
41 See “The EU ‘is losing battle on competitiveness’,” in Financial Times, January 13, 2003, p.3. Spain 
has lost 3 positions (is listed at number 20) in the last Globalization Index published by Foreign Policy 
(January/February 2003, no. 134, p. 60) and Portugal is listed at 14. In addition the  World Economic 
Forum has placed Spain and Portugal among the least competitive countries in the European Union (only 
Greece is behind) in its Report on Global Competitiveness. This report examines economic conditions in 
80 countries focusing on two main indexes: MICI (Microeconomic Competitiveness Index), which  
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will h inder further the convergence process. At the same time, differences in economic 
performance will be exacerbated within the EU by the accession of the central and 
eastern European states. Indeed, with the new ten member states joining, there is an 
increased risk of a “two-tier” Europe where some countries will do better than others. 
The EU has limited direct powers to force outcomes. The experiences of Portugal and 
Spain show that the influence of indirect EU recommendations on policy and 
demonstration effects has been greater than direct action. Hence, it is not surprising that 
European states, and particularly the Iberian countries, are failing to live up to the 
ambitious targets established in the European Council of Lisbon in March of 2000, 
which aimed at making the EU more competitive.   While EU membership will facilitate 
(and in many cases ameliorate) adjustment costs and will provide impetus for reforms, 
the experience of the Iberian countries shows that this is no substitute for the domestic 
implementation of reforms, which should proceed further in areas such as labor, 
product, and capital markets. The success of enlargement and institutional reforms will 
hinge to a considerable degree on the ability of European leaders to implement reforms 
in the face of domestic resistance and increasing skepticism about enlargement.  The 
enlargement process and the new C onvention will largely determine the future of 
Europe. Lack of progress will bring institutional paralysis and losses of 
competitiveness. The survival of the European model is at stake. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
measures the quality of business development, and the GCI (Growth Competitiveness Index), which 
examines growth perspectives in 5-8 years based on macroeconomic stability.   
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